

A137WX

URGENT

CUBA

ADVANCE FOR 11 A.M. EST TODAY

(ADVANCE) WASHINGTON, MAY 9 (AP) - SENATE INVESTIGATORS SAID TODAY THE OFFICIAL ESTIMATE OF 17,500 RUSSIANS STILL IN CUBA IS "PERHAPS A MINIMUM FIGURE" AND "STRATEGIC WEAPONS MAY OR MAY NOT BE NOW IN CUBA." AN INTERIM REPORT OF THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA AND LAST OCTOBER'S MISSILE CRISIS SAID:

"THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET EXPEDITION IN CUBA CAN NOW BE SEEN TO BE A MOST EFFECTIVE SHIELD AGAINST EITHER INTERNAL REVOLT BY NATIVE INSURGENTS, OR INVASION BY EXTERNAL FORCES FROM ANY SOURCE."

THE 34-PAGE REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, HEADED BY SEN. JOHN STENNIS D-MISS., ALSO WARNED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIETS IN CUBA "AFFECTS ADVERSELY OUR NATION'S IMAGE AND PRESTIGE."

"OUR FRIENDS ABROAD WILL UNDERSTANDABLY DOUBT OUR ABILITY TO MEET AND DEFEAT THE FORCES OF COMMUNISM THOUSANDS OF MILES ACROSS THE OCEAN IF WE PROVE UNABLE TO COPE WITH THE COMMUNIST THREAT AT OUR VERY DOORSTEP," THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID.

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A14 1WX (ADD CUBA)

(260)

ADVANCE FOR 11 A.M. EST TODAY

WASHINGTON--FIRST ADD CUBA (A137WX) X X X X SUBCOMMITTEE SAID. THE REPORT DESCRIBED CUBA AS "AN ADVANCED SOVIET BASE FOR SUBVERSIVE, REVOLUTIONARY AND AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE" AND SAID IT "AFFORDS THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPORT AGENTS, FUNDS, ARMS, AMMUNITION AND PROPAGANDA THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA."

"ASSUMING WITHOUT DECIDING THAT ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN," IT ADDED, "THERE IS THE EVER-PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF THE STEALTHY REINTRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC MISSILES AND OTHER OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, USING THE SOVIET FORCES STILL IN CUBA AS CAMOUFLAGE AND SECURITY FOR THE ACTIVITY."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR JUDGMENT THAT ALL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN REMOVED, "DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN CUBA NOW PRESENT A DIRECT AGGRESSIVE MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES OR LATIN AMERICA."

"STRATEGIC WEAPONS MAY OR MAY NOT BE NOW IN CUBA," THE REPORT ADDED. "WE CAN REACH NO CONCLUSION ON THIS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE."

AS TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA, THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID SOME SOURCES--PRIMARILY REFUGEE AND EXILE GROUPS--ESTIMATE THE NUMBER MAY BE AS HIGH AS 40,000.

THE REPORT CONTINUED:

"BEARING IN MIND THE LACK OF HARD EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION AND THE SUBSTANTIAL UNDERESTIMATION OF LAST FALL, WE CONCLUDE THAT NO ONE IN OFFICIAL UNITED STATES CIRCLES CAN TELL, WITH ANY REAL DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE, HOW MANY RUSSIANS ARE NOW IN CUBA AND WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE OFFICIAL 17,500 ESTIMATE IS PERHAPS A MINIMUM FIGURE."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE, WHICH CONDUCTED ITS INQUIRY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, SAID "ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE AGREE THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THE COMBAT GROUPS TROOPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOUR MOBILE ARMORED GROUPS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN."

JCI:121AED

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(290)

WASHINGTON--SECOND ADD CUBA 144110Z X X X WITHDRAWAL
THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID THAT IN LOOKING BACK AT LAST FALL'S MISSILE
CRISIS, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES CAN BE CRITICIZED IN SOME AREAS.
"WHILE A REASONABLY COMPETENT JOB WAS DONE IN ACQUIRING AND COLLECTING
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND DATA," IT SAID, "IN RETROSPECT IT
APPEARS THAT SEVERAL SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE MADE BY THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES IN THE EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION AND DATA WHICH HAS
ACCUMULATED."

IN A SUMMARY OF ITS MAJOR FINDINGS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID:

"FAULTY EVALUATION AND PREDISPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONVICTION THAT IT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET POLICY TO INTRODUCE STRATEGIC MISSILES INTO CUBA RESULTED IN INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS AND EVALUATIONS WHICH LATER PROVED TO BE ERRONEOUS. AMONG THESE WERE:

"(A) IT WAS NOT UNTIL AFTER A CONFIRMING PICTURE WAS OBTAINED ON OCTOBER 25TH, 1962, THAT IT WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT ORGANIZED SOVIET GROUND COMBAT UNITS WERE PRESENT IN CUBA. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS SHOULD BE OBVIOUS.

"(B) THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA WAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS. ON OCTOBER 22ND, OUR INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE 8,000 TO 10,000 SOVIETS IN CUBA. THEY NOW SAY THAT, AT THE HEIGHT OF THE BUILDUP, THERE WERE AT LEAST 20,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL ON THE ISLAND.

"(C) IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED ON OCTOBER 14TH THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCLUDED THAT STRATEGIC MISSILES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO CUBA. IN REACHING THEIR PRE-OCTOBER 14TH NEGATIVE JUDGMENT THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS WERE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THEIR JUDGMENT AS TO SOVIET POLICY AND INDICATIONS THAT STRATEGIC MISSILES WERE BEING INSTALLED WERE NOT GIVEN PROPER WEIGHT BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS WAS THE TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE TO DISCREDIT AND DOWNGRADE THE REPORTS OF CUBAN REFUGEES AND EXILES.

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AJTWX

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URG-5

(RELEASE AT 1000, EDT)

WASHINGTON. -- THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE SAID TODAY THE CUBA PROBLEM DESERVES THE "HIGHEST POSSIBLE PRIORITY" BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT WARNS A SIMILAR SOVIET TAKE-OVER "WILL BE ACHIEVED ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA UNLESS POSITIVE STEPS ARE TAKEN TO PREVENT IT."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID "THE PARAMOUNT DANGER AT THIS TIME IS THAT THE NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE MAY BE SUBVERTED ONE BY ONE AND BE EXPLOITED. IN TURN, FOR SUBVERSIVE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. THROUGH THIS PROCESS OF EROSION, OUR NEIGHBORS TO THE SOUTH MAY FALL NATION BY NATION UNTIL THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE IS LOST AND A COMMUNISTIC GOAL OF ISOLATING THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ATTAINED." THE GROUP SAID IN A CENSORED 34-PAGE INTERIM REPORT ON ITS CLOSED DOOR INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBAN BUILD-UP.

ALTHOUGH THE SUBCOMMITTEE NOTED A "FIRM FOOTHOLD" BY COMMUNISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, IT RECOMMENDED NO SPECIFIC STEPS FOR DEALING WITH IT OTHER THAN "THE GREATEST SURVEILLANCE AND WATCHFULNESS POSSIBLE" TO KEEP TABS ON THE SOVIET ACTIVITY IN CUBA.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE, HEADED BY SEN. JOHN C. STENNIS, D-MISS., BLAMED U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES FOR "FAULTY EVALUATION" IN NOT BELIEVING THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INTRODUCE STRATEGIC MISSILES INTO CUBA AND FOR A "TENDENCY...TO DISCREDIT AND DOWNGRADE THE REPORTS OF CUBAN REFUGEES AND EXILES."

THE GROUP SAID THAT WHILE ALL INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS WERE CONVINCED THAT ALL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM CUBA, THERE WAS NO "ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE" AND "IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS REMAIN ON THE ISLAND CONCEALED IN CAVES OR OTHERWISE."

IN ANY CASE, THE STENNIS PANEL SAID, "THERE IS REASON FOR GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE MATTER AND "IT IS OF THE GREATEST URGENCY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT STRATEGIC MISSILES ARE NOW CONCEALED IN CUBA." BUT THE GROUP DID NOT SAY HOW OTHER THAN THROUGH CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE.

AMONG ITS OTHER MAJOR FINDINGS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID: --ONLY PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE ESTABLISHED FIRMLY THE EXISTENCE OF STRATEGIC MISSILES IN CUBA LAST FALL AND "CREDIT IS DUE TO THOSE INVOLVED IN THIS MISSION."

--"A REASONABLY COMPETENT JOB" WAS DONE BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES BUT "SEVERAL SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE MADE....IN THE EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION AND DATA WHICH WAS ACCUMULATED."

--IT FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF AN ALLEGED "PHOTOGRAPHY GAP" BETWEEN SEPT. 5 AND OCT. 14 AND "SUCH CHARGES ARE UNFOUNDED."

--REPORTS OF A RIFT BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) OVER OPERATION OF U2 RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS ARE "WITHOUT MERIT;" THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE HIGH LEVEL FLIGHTS WERE TRANSFERRED FROM CIA TO THE AIR FORCE BECAUSE OF "A DEADLOCK OR FRICTION BETWEEN THE AGENCIES."

--"LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF CAVES" IN CUBA ARE "SUITABLE FOR STORAGE AND CONCEALMENT OF STRATEGIC MISSILES AND OTHER OFFENSIVE WEAPONS" AND "REFUGEES AND EXILES REPORTS CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THEY ARE BEING SO UTILIZED."

5/9--JD1105AED

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WASHINGTON (UPI-45) - INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS APPARENTLY UNDERESTIMATED THE NUMBER OF RUSSIANS IN CUBA LAST FALL. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO DOUBTED THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION AS TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIETS NEARLY 10,000 IN CUBA AND SAID THE PRESENT ESTIMATE OF 17,500 RUSSIANS ON THE ISLAND IS "PERHAPS A MINIMUM FIGURE." INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS "DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP IN CUBA NOW PRESENT A DIRECT AGGRESSIVE MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES OR LATIN AMERICA." HOWEVER, THE REPORT SAID, RUSSIAN COMBATS THERE "ARE QUITE POWERFUL DEFENSIVELY" AND WERE "CAPABLE OF SUPPRESSING ANY INTERNAL REBELLION OR REVOLT MOUNTED WITHOUT INTERNAL SUPPORT." "THE EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING THAT CASTRO IS SUPPORTING, ENCOURAGING AND AIDING AND ABETTING COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. THIS PRESENTS "A MAJOR AND INEVITABLE THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE AMERICAS." IN CONCLUDING THE REPORT TO CHAIRMAN RICHARD B. RUSSELL, D-GA., OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED SERVICES COMMITTEE, STENNIS SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE PLANNED TO CONTINUE ITS INQUIRY AND THAT OTHER REPORTS MAY BE FORTHCOMING.

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UPI-60 2

ADD 8 CUBA, WASHINGTON

WHEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY DECLARED THE CUBAN BLOCKADE ON OCT. 22, THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID, U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATED THAT ONLY 8,000 TO 10,000 SOVIETS WERE IN CUBA. LATER DEVELOPMENTS NOW INDICATE THAT THE NUMBER WAS ACTUALLY AROUND 22,000 AT THAT TIME, IT SAID. SINCE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT KNOW OF THESE ORGANIZED GROUND COMBAT UNITS IN CUBA, "HE COULD NOT INCLUDE THIS FACTOR" IN HIS DEMAND TO THE SOVIETS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE STRATEGIC MISSILES, THE GROUP REPORTED.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE FROWNS ON "A DISINGLINATION ON THE PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO ACCEPT AND BELIEVE THE OMINOUS PORTENT" OF INFORMATION GATHERED BEFORE THE BLOCKADE.

ALSO, THE GROUP SAID, "THE INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE APPARENTLY INvariably ADOPTED THE MOST OPTIMISTIC POSSIBLE... IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE CUSTOMARY MILITARY PRACTICE OF EMPHASIZING THE WORST SITUATION WHICH MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID "IRONCLAD ASSURANCE OF THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILES IN CUBA CAN COME ONLY AS A RESULT OF THOROUGH, PENETRATING ON-SITE INSPECTION BY RELIABLE OBSERVERS." IT SAID PRESENT BELIEF THAT NONE REMAIN "IS BASED LARGELY ON THE NEGATIVE EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS NO AFFIRMATIVE PROOF TO THE CONTRARY."

IN STRESSING THE CUBAN THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA, THE GROUP SAID "THE VITAL PANAMA CANAL COULD BE THE TARGET FOR SNEAK RAIDS ORIGINATING FROM CUBA" AND "ADVANCED SOVIET SUBMARINE BASES COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN CUBAN PORTS WITH VERY LITTLE EFFORT."

CUBA ALSO OFFERS A BASE FROM WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD INTERFERE WITH U.S. AIR AND SEA LANES AND HER AIRFIELDS COULD "SERVE AS RECOVERY AIR BASES FOR PLANES LAUNCHED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FROM THE SOVIET UNION."

5/9--JD&GE1157A

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UPI-72

ADD 3 (CORRECT) CUBA, WASHINGTON

SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JOHN C. STENNIS, D-MISS., TOOK THE SENATE FLOOR LATER TO CALL FOR "THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF ALL RUSSIANS FROM CUBA AND THE ADOPTION OF A FIRM AND HARD PLAN WHICH WILL RID OUR HEMISPHERE OF THIS THREAT ONCE AND FOR ALL." STENNIS SAID THAT SHOULD BE "THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY OF OUR NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY ONLY. HE TOLD THE SENATE THAT, "TO THOSE WHO SAY THIS INVOLVES RISKS AND THE DANGER OF A NUCLEAR WAR, I REPLY THAT THERE COMES A TIME--AS IT DID LAST OCTOBER--WHEN RISKS MUST BE TAKEN TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS."

THE MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRAT SAID "THE RISKS OF DOING NOTHING--OF ALLOWING THIS COMMUNIST THREAT TO FESTER AND GROW AND PERHAPS TO SUBVERT NATION AFTER NATION--ARE INFINITELY GREATER."

5/9--JD1234PED

UPI-77

ADD 4 CUBA, WASHINGTON

IN HIS FLOOR SPEECH, STENNIS SAID "WE MUST MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR TO ALL THE WORLD THAT THE HISTORIC MONROE DOCTRINE IS STILL PART AND PARCEL OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY AND THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE RISKS, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ABANDON IT NOW."

HE SAID "WE MUST DEMONSTRATE, BY DEED AS WELL AS BY WORD, THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO PREVENT EITHER IN CUBA OR ELSEWHERE IN THE AMERICAS THE CREATION OR USE OF ANY EXTERNALLY SUPPORTED MILITARY CAPABILITY WHICH ENDANGERS OUR SECURITY OR THAT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

ALSO, STENNIS SAID, THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY SHOWED THAT THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY POTENTIAL IS SO GREAT NOW--EVEN WITHOUT THE STRATEGIC MISSILES--THAT "WHATEVER CAPACITY AND WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM WHICH NOW EXISTS AMONG THE PEOPLE OF CUBA WILL FURTHER WITHER AND SHRINK AS TIME GOES BY."

HE SAID THE SOVIET CITADEL IN CUBA IS "THE GRAVEST AND MOST SERIOUS OF ALL THE CHALLENGES AND THREATS NOW CONFRONTING THE UNITED STATES. OUR VERY SURVIVAL MAY DEPEND UPON THE PROMPT AND PROPER SOLUTION OF IT."

5/9--JD1250PED

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